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TORTS-New Mexico Establishes a Cause of Action for Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress to a Bystander: Ramirez v. Armstrong

I. INTRODUCTION
In Ramirez v. Armstrong,1 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that,
under certain conditions, a cause of action exists for the negligent infliction of emotional distress to bystanders. 2 The Ramirez decision is especially important because its rationale, if applied in other cases, may
justify recovery for emotional distress even where the defined circumstances for bystander recovery do not exist. Ramirez represents an admirable attempt to recognize an individual's interest in emotional security.
Yet the court's reluctance to trust a jury to apply the traditional tort
principles engendered an artificial delineation of actionable emotional
injury to a bystander. This Note presents an analysis of Ramirez in light
of the three approaches used in other jurisdictions to assess the liability
to a bystander for negligently inflicted emotional distress. The impact of
Ramirez on negligence actions in New Mexico and potential problems
with its application also are discussed.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
While attempting to cross a street, Santana Ramirez was struck and
killed by a motor vehicle driven by William Armstrong. 3 Two of Ramirez's
children and an unrelated girl who lived with his family were walking
behind him and observed the accident. 4 A third child of Ramirez, not
present at the scene, was informed of her father's death and viewed his
body after the accident.'

Guardians of the four children brought suit on behalf of the children
for wrongful death and for damages for physical and mental injuries
resulting from the negligent infliction of emotional distress. 6 After settlement of the wrongful death action, the lower court granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the remaining claims
on the grounds that New Mexico recognized no cause of action for negI. 100 N.M. 538,
2. Id.at 539, 673
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.at 540, 673
6. Id.at 539, 673

673 P.2d 822 (1983).
P.2d at 823.
P.2d at 824.
P.2d at 823.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

ligent infliction of emotional distress. 7 The plaintiffs appealed the court's
ruling.'
On certification from the court of appeals, the supreme court held that,
under certain defined circumstances, the principles of foreseeability and
limited liability did not preclude recovery by a bystander for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. 9 The court established a four-pronged test
which must be satisfied, in addition to the traditional elements of negligence, to recover under this cause of action. 0 Applying this test to the
facts, the court reversed the dismissal of the complaint as to the children
of Ramirez who were present and who observed the fatal accident." The
supreme court affirmed the dismissal of the unrelated girl's claim because
of her lack of a close familial relationship to the victim. 2 The court also
held that the lower court had properly dismissed the claim of the daughter
who had not observed the accident, apparently because she had not experienced a contemporaneous sensory perception of the accident.' 3
III. ANALYSIS
A. HistoricalPerspective
The judiciary has long been reluctant to permit recovery of damages
for emotional distress.' 4 This is especially true when the absence of a
separate and independent tort by the defendant against the plaintiff precludes the emotional distress from falling in the category of parasitic
damages. 5 As the rationale for refusing to consider infliction of emotional
distress as an independent cause of action, the courts have often cited
the difficulty of measuring the damages and the fear of fictitious claims. 6
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 541-42, 673 P.2d at 825-26. The court also held that, because a bystander's action
is a separate and independent claim, the Wrongful Death Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-2-1 to -4 (Repl.
Pamp. 1982), does not bar an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 100 N.M. at 543,
673 P.2d at 827.
10. 100 N.M. at 541-42, 673 P.2d at 825-26. The court also indicated that the comparative
negligence principles adopted by New Mexico in Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234
(1981), will apply to actions for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. 100 N.M. at 542,
673 P.2d at 826. The comparative fault of each actor involved in the accident, including that of the
victim, will be assessed in order to determine the relative liabilities for the harm.
11. 100 N.M. at 543, 673 P.2d at 827.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See W. Prosser, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at 49-51 (4th ed. 1971).
15. Id. at 52. Parasitic damages are those injuries which cannot alone serve as a basis for a
redressable claim. Rather, an independent tort must support the award for the "parasitic" damages
deemed to flow from the breach of that tort. Id.Prosser noted that "a factor which is today recognized
as parasitic will, forsooth, tomorrow be recognized as an independent basis of liability." Id.at 52
n.47 (quoting from 1 Street, Foundations of Legal Liability 460, 470 (1906)).
16. W. Prosser, supra note 14, § 12, at 50-51.
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The primary reason that courts continue to reject the independent tort of
emotional distress, however, lies in the fear of unlimited liability. 7
Starting in the 1930s, the courts began to realize that the fear of
unlimited liability had no basis where the defendant purposely caused the
emotional distress. 8 The required element of outrage as to the intentional
act provided a sufficient guarantee that the emotional harm was both
serious and authentic. 9 The tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress thus gradually gained favor.
Where the distress was inflicted negligently, however, courts considered
the emotional harm and resulting injuries too speculative to support imposition of liability for merely negligent conduct. 20 Courts deemed such
injuries to be unforeseeable. 2 Courts found an exception, however, where
the emotional distress was precipitated by a fear for one's own physical
17. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d609, 617-19, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423-24,301 N.Y.S.2d
554, 560-61 (1969).
18. See W. Prosser, supra note 14, § 12, at 55-56. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 312
comment e (1965) (discussing the greater foreseeability of intentionally inflicted distress and its
consequences as compared with that which is negligently inflicted).
19. See W. Prosser, supra note 14, § 12, at 52.
20. See W. Prosser, supra note 14, § 54, at 333. Two exceptions to this view were found where
the negligent conduct involved the mishandling of a dead body or messages regarding the health or
death of a family member. Id., § 54, at 329-30. Under these circumstances, the harm was deemed
foreseeable and the fact patterns inherently seemed to offer a sufficient guarantee of genuine claims.
See, e.g., Cary v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181 (1959)
(negligent embalming of the corpse of the plaintiff's father); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Crumpton,
138 Ala. 632, 36 So. 517 (1903) (negligent failure of telegraph company to deliver message of the
death of plaintiff's mother).
21. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), presents the leading commentary on the proper justifications for imposing liability upon the negligent defendant for the harms
which he causes. The Palsgrafcourt developed the role of foreseeability of harm in the establishment
of a legally recognized duty to the individual plaintiff. See id. at 99. Palsgrafdealt with a case of
physical injury to the plaintiff, but its principles for the imposition of liability nonetheless prove
instructive for assessing recovery for negligenty caused emotional injuries. See id.
The plaintiff in Palsgraf was injured by a scale at a railway station when employees of the
defendant railroad negligently attempted to help a third party board a moving train. Id. An innocent
looking package carried by the third party contained fireworks which exploded when the package
fell to the ground. Id. The repercussion from that explosion caused the scales to fall on the plaintiff.
Id.
Writing for the Palsgrafmajority, Chief Judge Cardozo reasoned that a plaintiff must show that
the duty is owed to her individually; a plaintiff may not recover as a "vicarious beneficiary of a
breach of duty to another." Id. at 100-01. The Palsgraf majority defined the duty to another by
reference to the risks of harm to the plaintiff which are reasonably perceived. See id. Foreseeability
of harm comprises a reasonable expectation by a vigilant person that the type of harm suffered by
the plaintiff will be a natural and probable consequence of the defendant's negligent conduct. See
id. at 101. The mere fact of injury will not justify the imposition of liability for a negligent wrongful
act. See id.
In order to impose a duty, the harm experienced by the plaintiff must be within the zone of
foreseeable consequences. See id. Arguably, the zone of emotional danger extends beyond the zone
of physical danger. The physical zone of risk is basically limited by the sense of touch, while the
emotional zone is affected by all of the senses. The limits of perception, not merely distance from
the defendant's conduct, create the boundaries of the zone of psychic impact.
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safety. 22 Under such a circumstance, the fear was deemed foreseeable.
The courts thus began to allow recovery for negligently inflicted emotional
distress resulting from a threat to one's physical integrity.23
The so-called "impact" and "zone of danger" rules were created to
allow recovery only if the distress was occasioned by a fear for one's
own safety.24 The "impact" rule denies recovery to a plaintiff for harms
resulting from emotional distress unless the plaintiff proves some actual
25
physical contact with his person caused by the defendant. Although the
impact requirement sought to prevent fraudulent claims by providing an
objective proof of reasonable fear for one's physical safety, it resulted in
stretching the technical "impact" requirement beyond reason in order to
permit recovery."
The "zone of danger" rule dispensed with the impact requirement in
order to provide relief to deserving plaintiffs suffering from emotional
distress caused by a fear for their own safety, but who had escaped physical
impact by the defendant's fortuitous "miss." 27 The rule nonetheless still
required that the plaintiff himself be within the "zone of physical danger"
and not merely in fear for the safety of a third person.28
Both the "impact" and "zone of danger" rules reflect a presumption
that foreseeable emotional harm to the bystander arises only where the
defendant's negligent conduct physically threatens the bystander. 29 Courts
22. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313 comment d (1965). Once the defendant's actions
have physically threatened the plaintiff, however, this breach of duty will support recovery for bodily
injuries resulting solely from fear for the safety of an immediate family member. Id. at §436 (3).
23. See generally Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1337 (1970) (a discussion of the traditional view denying
any liability for emotional distress and of the rationales for and applications of the three modem
rules for defining liability to a bystander for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
24. In Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968), the dissent noted that even under
the "zone of danger" rule "[tihe impact feared must be to oneself, and it must be an objective
fear-not merely that of an excessively imaginative or timid plaintiff." 69 Cal. Rptr. at 87, 441
P.2d at 927 (1968) (Burke, J., dissenting).
25. W. Prosser, supra note 14, § 54, at 330-32.
26. See, e.g., Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 155, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of smoke);
Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931) (fall caused by the plaintiff fainting from
fright); Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928) (defendant's horse
"evacuated his bowels" on the plaintiff's lap).
27. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). In
Tobin, the court viewed the "zone of danger" rule as an expansion of the "impact" rule rather than
the creation of a wholly new cause of action. See id. at 613, 249 N.E.2d at 420-21, 301 N.Y.S.2d
at 556-57.
28. The first Restatement of Torts left open the possibility of recovery by a spouse or parent for
emotional distress suffered from observing the negligent injury of his loved one. See Restatement
of Torts § 313, caveat at 851 (1934). However, the addition of § 313(2) resulted in the deletion of
this caveat and the second Restatement now encompasses the "zone of danger" rule. See Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 313 (1934). See also Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295
(1978), for an excellent discussion and critique of these rules and their ultimate rejection by the
Massachusetts court.
29. See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) (applying the
"impact" rule, which was later abandoned by Massachusetts in Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass.
555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978)); Amaya v. Holme Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d
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applying the "impact" and "zone of danger" rules reason that no person
truly could foresee that the bystander would have such a severe reaction
to perceiving another in danger so as to experience harm as a result.3 °
Imposing a duty to keep a bystander secure in his or her emotional
tranquility, they assert, would result in virtually unlimited liability.3" Merely
negligent action is deemed insufficiently culpable to justify imposition of
such liability.32 The courts further assert that any relaxation of these rules
would promote fraudulent claims, result in arbitrary distinctions as to
what is foreseeable, flood the courts with claims, and open the door to
plaintiffs of unusual sensitivity to shock.33
In the watershed case of Dillon v. Legg,34 the California Supreme Court
rejected the policies underlying the "impact" and "zone of danger" rules
and permitted recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress by a
bystander in no physical danger. The Dillon court dealt with a situation
in which emotional distress was caused by observing a loved one in
peril." The court's primary concern was that admittedly deserving plaintiffs might not recover because of a conviction that emotional harm to a
bystander was not reasonably foreseeable.36 The court agreed that the
harm was not sufficiently foreseeable where the bystander was a stranger
to the victim or had a distant relationship to him.37 Nonetheless, the
majority reasoned that severe emotional distress could be anticipated by
513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (applying the "zone of danger" rule; Amaya was later overruled in
Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 85, 441 P.2d 912, 925 (1968)). See also W. Prosser, supra note
14, §54, at 333-35.
30. W. Prosser, supranote 14, § 54, at 333. The principles of foreseeability as put forth in Palsgraf
v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) are more fully discussed supra
note 20.
31. See Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at 615-17, 249 N.E.2d at 422-24, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558-60. But see
Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980) (reversing summary judgment against a mother
who suffered emotional distress as a result of helplessly watching for four hours the slow death of
her son who was trapped by an elevator). The Portee court stated that "[tihe interest assertedly
injured is more than a general interest in emotional tranquility. It is the profound and abiding sentiment
of parental love." Id. at 93, 417 A.2d at 526.
32. See Pearson, Liability to Bystandersfor Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm--A Comment
on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. Fla. L. Rev. 477 (1982) (maintaining that imposition of
liability for emotional distress punishes the defendant rather than compensating the plaintiff, and
advocating the zone of danger rule because it limits liability by means of an internally consistent
rationale).
33. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
34. 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968).
35. Id. at 75, 441 P.2d at 915. The plaintiff mother in Dillon had suffered emotional distress
from watching a negligently driven car strike her daughter. The victim's sister also saw the accident
and she alleged similar emotional injury. Both plaintiffs alleged physical manifestations of the distress.
The mother's claim had been dismissed by the lower court because she, unlike the plaintiff sister,
had been outside the "zone of physical danger" at the time of the accident. Id.
36. See id. at 77-78, 441 P.2d at 917-18. The majority opinion emphasized that because duty is
so intertwined with foreseeability, "no immutable rule can establish the extent of that obligation [to
the bystander] for every circumstance of the future." Id. at 80, 441 P.2d at 920.
37. Id. at 81,441 P.2d at 921.
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the ordinary person where the bystander had a close relationship to the
victim and had personally witnessed the accident. 38
The Dillon majority discarded administrative difficulties as grounds for
the wholesale denial of legal redress to all plaintiff bystanders.39 Instead,
the court, opting for a case-by-case determination of the degree of foreseeability of harm to a particular bystander plaintiff, used the following
factors as guidelines: (1) whether the plaintiff was located close to the
accident; (2) whether the shock resulted from the sensory and contemporaneous observation of the accident; and (3) whether the victim and
the plaintiff had a close relationship. 4 The court expressly confined its
ruling to cases in which the emotional distress resulted in physical injury
to the bystander plaintiff.4 The majority declined to determine whether
liability could be imposed in future cases where some of the factors were
absent or of reduced weight when compared with those presented in the
Dillon case. 42
B. The Ramirez Decision
New Mexico law permits recovery for injuries resulting from severe
emotional distress when the distress has been intentionally inflicted.43 The
Ramirez case presented the first opportunity for the court to decide directly
if relief is available for negligent infliction of emotional distress where
the bystander has alleged physical manifestations of the distress.'
Noting that the theory of negligence encompasses the concepts of duty
and foreseeability, 45 the Ramirez court discussed the roles of these con38. The majority expressed revulsion towards the view that the interest in the safety of loved
ones was less foreseeable or less worthy of protection than the interest in one's own physical integrity.
Id. at 78-79 n.4, 441 P.2d at 918-19 n.4.
39. Id. at 82, 441 P.2d at 922.
40. Id. at 80-81, 441 P.2d at 920-21.
41. Id. at 80, 441 P.2d at 920.
42. Id. at 81, 441 P.2d at 921. But see infra notes 81-87 and accompanying text for California's
later restrictive interpretation of the Dillon guidelines.
43. Dominguez v. Stone, 97 N.M. 211, 638 P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1981) (claim for emotional
distress where the defendant made statements before a public meeting that the plaintiff was unsuited
for her current employment because of her Mexican alienage and ethnicity).
44. In Curry v. Journal Pub. Co., 41 N.M. 318, 68 P.2d 168 (1937), the supreme court held that
negligently spoken words cannot constitute a cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional
distress. In Curry, the Albuquerque Journal had incorrectly reported the death of former territorial
governor, George Curry. Curry's son alleged that his distress from the article had triggered a heart
attack. Curry's daughter-in-law alleged physical injuries to both herself and the child she was carrying
at the time of the report. The court in Ramirez expressly overruled dicta in Curry to the extent that
it conflicted with the holding in Ramirez. 100 N.M. at 540, 673 P.2d at 824.
The New Mexico courts avoided addressing the issue on two previous occasions on the grounds
that no physical manifestation of injury or actual physical injury to the bystander was alleged or
proven. See Thompkins v. Carlsbad Irrigation Dist., 96 N.M. 368, 630 P.2d 767 (1981), andAragon
v. Speelman, 83 N.M. 285, 491 P.2d 173 (1971).
45. See supra note 20.
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cepts in establishing a legal obligation not to invade a bystander's interest
in freedom from emotional distress.46 The court first considered the three
rules used in other jurisdictions to assess liability to a bystander. 7 The
Ramirez court rejected the "impact" and "zone of danger" rules and
instead embraced the rationale adopted by California in Dillon v. Legg.48
The court agreed that, under some circumstances, the ordinary person
should foresee harm to a bystander resulting from fear for another's
safety.49 In such cases, the principle of foreseeability does not stand as
a barrier to the establishment of a bystander cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress."
In its unamimous opinion, the Ramirez court concluded that, to justify
liability under the bystander cause of action, the identification of the
specific personal interest to be protected is more important than foreseeability.' The court stressed that the legal conclusion of "duty" simply
delineates an obligation to which the law will give recognition and effect. 52
Thus, a legal duty will be established only if a protected interest is
infringed when a bystander suffers the distress from fear for the safety
of another. 3 Where the person in peril is a loved one of the bystander,
the court determined that the "marital or intimate familial relationship"
is the essence of this interest and is worthy of legal protection. 4 The
court characterized an invasion of this interest as a "tort against the
integrity of the family unit."'
46. 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825.
47. See Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541,673 P.2d at 825. The Palsgrafcaseand principles are discussed
supra note 20. The three rules for liability to a bystander are more fully addressed in supra notes
23-41 and accompanying text.
48. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 (1968). Ramirez termed
this the "negligence theory" rationale for imposing liability. The Dillon rule and reasoning are more
fully discussed supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text.
49. See 100 N.M. at 541-42, 673 P.2d at 825-26.
50. See id. The Ramirez court noted that the defendant had relied most heavily on the leading
case opposing the Dillon rule, Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d
554 (1969). In Tobin, the New York Court of Appeals conceded that a negligent actor should foresee
harm to a mother who witnesses injury to her young child, but expressed concern that "foreseeability,
once recognized, is not so easily limited ... [and] would, in short order, extend logically to caretakers
other than the mother, and ultimately to affected bystanders." Id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 422, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 558 (1969).
51. Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825. This passage could be read to endorse the
imposition of duty without regard to the foreseeability of the consequences to the bystander where
the interest to be protected was of considerable import. Yet, this construction would render meaningless the court's reliance on the Palsgrafprinciple of foreseeability.
52. Id.
53. See id.
54. See Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825. The New Jersey Supreme Court had previously
used this term to describe the essential relationship for bringing the bystander action for emotional
distress. Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 94, 417 A.2d 521, 527 (1980). The Ramirez court agreed
with the concusion that "[tihe law should find more than pity for one stricken by seeing that a loved
one has been critically injured or killed." 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825 (quoting Jaffee, 84
N.J. at 97, 417 A.2d at 526).
55. 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825.
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To insure imposition of liability only when emotional harm to the
bystander is actually foreseeable, the court required that, in addition to
the traditional elements of negligence, the plaintiff bystander allege and
prove four criteria. 56 These criteria include:
1. An accident resulting in physical injury or death to the victim;
2. A severe shock to the plaintiff that results from a direct emotional
impact caused by the plaintiff's contemporaneous sensory perception of the accident;
3. A marital or intimate familial relationship between the victim and
the plaintiff, limited to husband and wife, parent and child, grandparent and grandchild, brother and sister, and to those persons
who occupy a legitimate position in loco parentis;
4. An emotional injury resulting in some physical manifestation or
physical injury to the plaintiff. 7
C. The Ramirez Rule Elements
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court followed the reasoning of
Dillon, it chose not to establish guidelines for assessing foreseeability on
a case-by-case basis. Rather, the court in effect established four additional
"elements" of foreseeability necessary to state a claim for the negligent
infliction of emotional distress to a bystander. By means of these standards, the court sought to make recovery possible to deserving plaintiffs
58
while limiting liability to harm that is actually foreseeable.
1. Physical Injury to the Victim
The first requirement, that the victim of the accident must have suffered
59
physical injury or death, has no Dillon counterpart. This may be a
response to the Dillon dissent which questioned the imposition of liability
when the bystander has been honestly mistaken in his or her belief that
the "victim" was injured or in danger.6
Two possible rationales might support the existence of this element.
First, any injury resulting from such a mistaken impression might be
caused by a bystander's overly sensitive disposition to emotional dis56. Id. at 541-42, 673 P.2d at 825-26. The court stressed that no new obligation of conduct was
imposed because the use of ordinary care by potential defendants will prevent liability.
57. Id. These elements are more fully discussed infra section III.C. of this Note.
58. Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825.
59. Compare Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541-42, 673 P.2d at 825-26, with Dillon, 69 Cal. Rptr. at
80, 441 P.2d at 920. Ramirez failed to specify a requisite degree of physical injury to the victim.
New Jersey holds that serious bodily injury to the victim is necessary for bystander recovery. See
Portee, 84 N.J. at 94, 417 A.2d at 527.
60. Dillon, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 86, 441 P.2d at 926 (Burke, J.,dissenting).
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tress. 6' Second, the shock to the bystander logically should dissipate when
he or she realizes that no member of the family suffered an injury.
Yet the requirement of physical injury to the victim suggests that the
62
cause of action for the bystander may not comprise an independent tort.
Instead, the liability to the bystander may be a derivative of the liability
to the victim. Thus, unless the victim suffers actual physical injury, the
bystander's reaction to the perceived threatened physical injury is irrelevant.
2. Contemporaneous Sensory Perception of the Accident
The second Ramirez criterion requires that the severe shock to the
bystander result from the contemporaneous sensory perception of the
accident. 63 This element is based on the theory that a defendant is more
likely to foresee harm where the third party directly perceives the accident
than where the third party merely learns of the incident later. 4 "Without
such perception, the threat of emotional injury is lessened and the justification for liability is fatally weakened. -65 Future litigation will surely
seek to define the terms "contemporaneous" and "perception." ' For
61. But see Martinez v. Teague, 96 N.M. 446, 631 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1981). In Martinez, the
New Mexico Court of Appeals stated that "there is nothing 'highly extraordinary' in incurring
psychological problems as the result of an accident." Id. at 451, 631 P.2d at 1319.
62. This requirement may weaken the assertion that the Palsgrafprinciples support the imposition
of a duty to the bystander. See supra note 20 (regarding the Palsgrafrule that a duty exists only
where the plaintiff sues in his own right to be free from the defendant's conduct).
63. 100 N.M. at 541-42, 673 P.2d at 825-26. The Ramirez opinion cited to Dominguez v. Stone,
97 N.M. 211, 638 P.2d 423 (Ct. App. 1981), and held that the same standard used for intentionally
inflicted distress would apply to this action. The standard requires that "the distress inflicted is so
severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it." 97 N.M. at 215, 638 P.2d at 427.
64. Prior to Ramirez, the New Mexico Supreme Court had indicated that it would find a bystander
claim for emotional distress inappropriate in those cases where the injury was not due to a sudden
traumatic event. Wilson v. Gait, 100 N.M. 227, 233, 668 P.2d 1104, 1110 (Ct. App. 1983), cert.
quashed, 100 N.M. 192, 668 P.2d 308. Thus, the lingering effects of medical malpractice probably
do not satisfy the legal definition of accident for purposes of a bystander's claim. But see Bohrer,
Fear and Trembling in the Twentieth Century: Technological Risk, Uncertainty and Emotional Distress, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 83 (presenting a model for emotional distress claims and advocating,
because of technological advances, a liberal interpretation of "traumatic" event where the injuries
are manifested after a sometimes long dormant period).
65. Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 94, 417 A.2d 521, 527 (1980).
66. A California Court of Appeals permitted recovery by a mother who had not witnessed the
explosion which injured her child, but who had seen the child's injuries within moments of the
accident. Archibald v. Braverman, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (Ct. App. 1969). The court reasoned that "the
shock of seeing a child severely injured immediately after the tortious event may be just as profound
as that experienced in witnessing the accident itself." Id. at 725 (1969). Later cases have more
strictly construed the term "contemporaneous." See, e.g., Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal.
App. 3d 728, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435 (1980) (parents denied recovery for failure to observe the injuryproducing event although they saw their dying son within minutes of his electrocution). See also
Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 562 P.2d 1022, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1977) (plaintiff husband
present at the accident scene could maintain an action although he did not observe the accident
because he knew from his wife's position that she had been struck by a car).
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instance, the mother who hears the squeal of tires, but only minutes later
67
finds her dying child, would desire a broad interpretation of these terms.
Because the sensory perception of the accident, not the result of the
accident, triggers the severe emotional distress, the Ramirez court wisely
68
omitted the Dillon factor of close proximity to the accident. As noted
by the Dillon dissent, the factor relating to the specific physical location
of the bystander to the accident has a tenuous bearing on the foreseeability
of the
of harm. 69 Rather, "[t]he risk of emotional injury exists by virtue
7
plaintiff's perception of the accident, not his proximity to it." "
3. Marital or Intimate Familial Relationship
The third criterion of the Ramirez test defines the interest the court
deemed worthy of protection, that of the "marital, or intimate familial
relationship." 7 The usual emotional ties to one's family make actual
distress more likely and also insure the sincerity of a claim. The court
chose to limit the requisite relationship to specific degrees of consanguinity or the existence of a legally recognized marital status rather than
rely upon the jury to determine whether the protected interest was sufficiently present.
In limiting the function of the jury, the court anticipated claims by
remote relatives and opted to constrain the liability of the negligent defendant. Yet, many deserving plaintiffs whose injury may be equally
foreseeable will be automatically barred from recovery. A victim's fianc6e, or an unmarried cohabitant who observes the defendant's act of
negligence cannot state a claim solely because of his insufficiently close
relationship to the victim.72 A more distant relative who nonetheless main67. In precisely this situation, the New York court refused to accept the Dillon rationale for fear
that recovery under these circumstances would unleash the concept of unlimited liability for merely
negligent conduct. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554
(1969).
68. Compare Ramirez, 100 N.M. at 541-42, 673 P.2d at 825-26, with Dillon, 69 Cal. Rptr. at
80, 441 P.2d at 920.
69. 69 Cal. Rptr. at 86, 441 P.2d at 926 (Burke, J., dissenting).
70. Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 94, 417 A.2d 521, 527 (1980).
71. 100 N.M. at 541, 673 P.2d at 825. This policy-based decision is arguably an attempt by the
Ramirez court to draw an arbitrary, but internally consistent line for preventing unlimited liability
for negligent conduct. See generally Pearson, supra note 31 (examining the arbitrary nature of the
bystander recovery rules).
72. But see Ledger v. Tippitt, 210 Cal. Rptr. 814 (Ct. App. 1985). In Ledger, the defendant had
stabbed and killed a man who had lived with the plaintiff for two years and who had fathered her
child. Id. at 815-16. The decedent and the plaintiff had twice attempted to get married, but circumstances beyond their control had frustrated their plans. Id. The plaintiff had observed the stabbing
and the victim died in her arms. The court dismissed California precedent and held that the plaintiff
stated a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress under the Dillon rule. Id.
at 826-28. See generally Comment, The Right of an Unmarried Cohabitant to an Action for Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress in California, 15 Pac. L.J. 925 (1984) (supporting an extention of
the cause of action for domestic partners, whether heterosexual or homosexual, of the victim).
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tains a closer actual relationship to the victim than those within the
requisite degree of kinship is also precluded from recovery. The line the
court draws appears arbitrary. This line, however, may also be seen as a
rational attempt to limit liability to those instances where the protected
interest will most likely be promoted."
4. Physical Manifestation of Emotional Distress
Proof of some physical manifestation of the emotional distress is the
fourth criterion of the New Mexico rule.7 4 Such proof arguably assures
that the emotional distress suffered is sufficiently serious to warrant imposition of liability upon the defendant." This element possibly serves
to ferret out trivial and fraudulent claims of emotional distress.76 Yet at
least one jurisdiction no longer prohibits recovery in the absence of some
physical manifestation of the emotional distress. 7 Possibly, enhanced
medical knowledge is seen as a reliable indicator of the authenticity of
the claim.78
D. Implications of Ramirez
The New Mexico Supreme Court was clearly attempting to respond to
Dillonrule critics by specifically defining which relationships of the victim
to the bystander create sufficient foreseeability of harm. 79 The court's
definition does prevent unlimited liability. The Ramirez court, however,
surveyed the universe of foreseeable emotional harms and created an
arbitrary and artificial distinction between those harms which are legally
redressable and those which are not. Nonetheless, the rule provides internal consistentency by rooting the recovery in a policy of protecting
the family unit.
Future litigators may seek to establish interests which are analogous
73. Even the final Ramirez category of sufficiently close relationships, in loco parentis, will seek
to protect a parent-child type interest. In loco parentis: In the place of a parent; instead of a parent;
charged, facticiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 708 (5th ed. 1979).
74. 100 N.M. at 542, 673 P.2d at 826.
75. See W. Prosser, supra note 14, § 55, at 335.
76. See Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974).
77. See id. Hawaii has been at the forefront of eradicating what are viewed as artificial barriers
to recovery. The Leong case not only sustained recovery in the absence of resulting physical injury,
but also for distress caused by observing the death of the mother of the plaintiff's step-father. Id.
at 766. The Hawaiian courts more readily recognize a general right to be free from psychic injury
without resort to relying on another interest to be protected. See Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509
(Haw. 1970).
78. See Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d at 519-20. But see Comment, Traumatic Neurosis and
Malingering: Illuminating Aladdin's Lamp, 3 N.M.L. Rev. 381 (1973) (discussing the difficulties
in detecting intangible emotional harm).
79. See, e.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969);
Pearson, supra note 31, at 495-99.
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to the integrity of the family unit. Recognition of such interests would
provide for recovery for emotional distress to deserving plaintiffs not
satisfying the Ramirez test, and yet would prevent unlimited liability in
a principled manner. The New Mexico courts would likely find the interest
sufficiently compelling
in self-integrity, like the interest in the family unit,
0 Other interests which are
and foreseeable to warrant similar protection."
less likely to prevail might include interests in the integrity of property,
the integrity of contractual relationships, and the integrity of a fetus."'
Within the Ramirez cause of action, the courts will be called upon to
define the boundaries of several terms incorporated in the Ramirez elements. Future plaintiffs will seek expansive interpretations of such terms
as "contemporaneous," "perception," and "accident." The necessary
degree of physical injury to the victim and the requisite extent of physical
manifestation of emotional distress also remain to be clarified.
If California's experience with the Dillon rule proves instructive, the
New Mexico court will probably strictly interpret the Ramirez elements
for bystander distress claims.8 2 In 1980, however, the California Supreme
83
Court ruled in Molien v. Kaiser FoundationHospitals that, under certain
circumstances, the Dillon guidelines need not be satisfied in order to
84
recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress . The court found that
the Dillon limitations on recovery are inapplicable where the plaintiff can
be characterized as a "direct victim" rather than a percipient witness of
the defendant's negligence. 8 5 The court relied upon the principles of
victim"
foreseeability expressed in Dillon to impose a duty to the "direct
86 Apparently,
fashion.
a
rote
in
guidelines
Dillon
the
apply
to
refused
and
the court found foreseeability of harm to the direct victim to be less
80. As noted by the Ramirez court, "we have not succumbed in the past to arguments concerning
the dangers of expanded liability." 100 N.M. at 542, 673 P.2d at 826.
81. See, e.g., Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 501 P.2d 368 (Haw. 1972) (recovery allowed for emotional
distress and disappointment due to recklessly broken contract); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509
(Haw. 1970) (recovery permitted for emotional distress which resulted from negligently caused
property damage to plaintiff's home).
82. See Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from
Chaos, 33 Hastings L.J. 583 (1982); Simons, PsychicInjury and the Bystander:The Transcontinental
Dispute Between Californiaand New York, 51 St. John's L. Rev. 1 (1976).
83. 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813 (1980).
84. See id. at 834-35, 616 P.2d at 816-17. InMolien, the plaintiff sued a hospital for his emotional
distress resulting from the hospital incorrectly diagnosing his wife as having syphilis. Prior to filing
the lawsuit, the plaintiff and his wife had divorced as a result of marital friction caused by the
misdiagnosis.
85. Id. See Comment, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress:Reconciling the Bystander and
Direct Victim Causes of Action, 18 U.S.F.L. Rev. 145 (1983). New York's highest court, which
rejected the Dillon rationale in Tobin, had earlier established a similar direct victim cause of action
for emotional distress based, not on foreseeability, but on a direct duty undertaken by the defendant.
Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 334 N.E.2d 590, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1975) (plaintiff daughter
incorrectly informed of mother's death).
86. 167 Cal. Rptr. at 834-35, 616 P.2d at 816-17.
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remote than foreseeability of harm to the percipient witness bystander.87
The court also eliminated the need for physical manifestation of the
emotional distress for a direct victim cause of action.8"
The Ramirez court cited to the Molien opinion and was, therefore,
aware of California's extension of the Dillon foreseeability principles.89
This observation may signal a similar willingness to extend the Ramirez
rationale to cases of emotional distress which fail to satisfy the Ramirez
elements. Thus, the Ramirez rationale, even more than its holding, may
play a significant role in the development of negligence actions in New
Mexico.
IV. CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court in Ramirez v. Armstrong established
a test for identifying those situations in which a defendant may be held
liable to a bystander for negligently inflicted emotional distress arising
from fear for another's safety. Future negligence actions will undoubtedly
attempt to extend the policy-oriented rationale of Ramirez to include
protection from emotional distress for other significant interests beyond
the marital or intimate familial relationship.
Ramirez was a positive step toward recognition of emotional interests
worthy of legal protection. Although it is desirable that recovery for this
harm be both available to deserving plaintiffs and yet limited to those
cases in which the emotional harm is reasonably foreseeable, the court's
ruling may exclude recovery in cases where both of these desired conditions exist.
Dillon's initial guideline approach for jury assessment of foreseeability
and duty on a case-by-case basis would have been preferable to the
imposition of duty only when the specific elements of Ramirez are met.
Inherent mistrust that the jury will impose liability for negligently caused
injuries beyond the confines of traditional tort principles has led the New
Mexico court to construct an arbitrary barrier to recovery. As Justice
Trobiner pointed out in Dillon, "[Ilegal history shows that artificial islands
of exceptions, created from the fear that the legal process will not work,
usually do not withstand the waves of reality and, in time, descend into
oblivion.,9
KAREN MOLZEN
87. See id. The Molien court relied on a statutory provision which deems a false imputation of
syphilis as slander per se as well as the likely effects on a marriage such a misdiagnosis might
precipitate. Id. at 839, 616 P.2d at 821.
88. Id. at 838-39, 616 P.2d at 820-21.
89. See 100 N.M. at 542, 673 P.2d at 826. Molien was cited for the proposition that Dillon had
not proven unmanageable for the courts, nor had it unleashed unlimited liability. Id.
90. Dillon, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 85, 441 P.2d at 925.

